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Abstract
The management of commons is now at the centre of researchers’ attention in many 
branches of science, particularly those related to the human or social sciences. This paper 
seeks to demonstrate how civil society participation in common goods or resources is not 
only possible but is also desirable for society because of the medium and long-term benefits 
it offers involved and/or affected parties. To this end, we examine the falsity of the discourse 
underlying the supposed incompetence of civil society to cooperate interpersonally in the 
pursuit of common objectives, and also analyse a specific example of the necessary and pos-
sible participation of civil society in managing common goods through biobanks.
Keywords: civil society, common godos, biobanks, ethical management.
Resumen
La gestión del bien común se ha convertido actualmente en centro de atención para 
diferentes ramas de la ciencia, especialmente aquellas vinculadas con lo humano y lo social. 
El presente estudio busca mostrar cómo la participación de la sociedad civil en la gestión 
de este tipo de bienes o recursos no sólo es posible, sino deseable para la sociedad por los 
beneficios que reporta a las partes implicadas y/o afectadas a medio y largo plazo. Para ello, 
se atenderá la falsedad del discurso sobre el cual se asienta la supuesta incompetencia de 
la sociedad civil para poder cooperar interpersonalmente en busca de objetivos comunes, 
así como se analizará un ejemplo concreto de la necesaria y posible participación de la 
sociedad civil en la gestión del bien común a través de los centros de recursos biológicos 
(BRCs).
Palabras clave: sociedad civil, bien común, biobancos, gestión ética.
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Studies into the concept and social role of the common –not public– 
good can be traced back to the classical period and continue today. From 
Plato to John Stuart Mill, by way of Aristotle, St Thomas of Aquino, Niccolò 
Machiavelli, Erasmus of Rotterdam, Thomas Hobbes and Antonio Genovesi, 
among others: all have theorised on the question, drawing connections with 
governance, morality, happiness, peace, excellence or laws.
In recent decades, concern over the inefficiency of the markets, the over-
exploitation of natural ecosystems, the political disaffection of democratic 
societies and the unsustainability of the welfare state has brought the man-
agement of common goods to the forefront of attention for many thinkers 
in their respective areas of knowledge, particularly in disciplines related to 
the human and social sciences. Political scientists such as Elinor Ostrom and 
Carole J. Uhlaner, economists like Stefano Zamagni, Oliver E. Williamson and 
Christian Felber, the sociologists Pierpaolo Donati, Renate Mayntz and Wol-
gang Hofkirchner and philosophers such as Jacques Maritain and Martha 
Nussbaum, for example, have undertaken research at varying levels on the 
concept of and the best ways of managing common goods in different 
spheres of human activity. Among other issues, most of these scholars stress 
the need to foster civil society participation in managing the common good; 
on the one hand, because defining a society’s common good and legitimat-
ing its management does not depend on governments, but on the intersub-
jective agreement of all those affected by it; and on the other hand, because 
managing the common good efficiently and sustainably requires collective 
actions of a society’s citizens and organisations, as has been clearly reflected 
in case studies (Cárdenas and Ostrom, 2004; Ostrom, 1990, 2002; Ostrom and 
Nagendra, 2010).
Today, however, despite the studies and empirical evidence, the tenden-
tious discourse still persists on the supposed incapacity of civil society to 
manage a common good efficiently and sustainably, arguing that the only 
possible solution to ensure its survival is by turning it into a public or private 
good. Issue 15 of Recerca. Revista de Pensament i Anàlisis makes a signifi-
cant contribution in this regard, by exploring the falsity of this nineteenth-
century discourse and highlighting the cooperative and coordinating com-
petences of civil society to meet common objectives through collective 
actions of various kinds in both politics and the economy.  This special issue 
is part of the research project «Ética de la democracia: crisis de la política y 
nuevas formas de participación de la sociedad civil», [P1.1B2013-24], funded 
by Universitat Jaume I of Castelló.
This article sets out to introduce the contributions in this monographic 
issue of Recerca. Revista de Pensament i Anàlisis on «Managing the common 
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good: new forms of civil society participation in politics and the economy». 
The main aim of this issue is to bring to light the possibilities of interpersonal 
and intergroup cooperation in the different spheres of human activity, by 
clarifying both the theoretical framework of these arguments and by explor-
ing a practical case in the form of biological resource centres (BRCs).
THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION
In 1968, the ecologist Garrett Hardin metaphorically imagined the trage-
dy underlying the situation of a society that leaves the management of its 
common goods or resources in the hands of its individuals or associations. 
Based on one of the axioms of economic theory –the supposed propensity 
of individuals to maximise their own gain–, he predicted the point of no 
return that all collective action processes lead to if they are not coordinated 
by an external institution with the capacity to generate binding norms and 
apply coercive laws, namely, the overexploitation of limited resources and 
their irreversible disappearance.
Thus, Hardin put forward two worrying and unsolvable questions. First, 
that every attempt civil society makes to coordinate action to manage a par-
ticular common good or resource, be it a forest, a river basin, pasture land, a 
sea or an urban habitat, is futile without the help of external coercion that 
obliges the parties involved to respect the agreements reached. And second, 
that relying on the capacity of agents to cooperate and coordinate the action 
inevitably leads to the extinction of the managed common good or re-
source. 
As the author himself clarifies, this is the drama that hangs over individu-
als because of their natural propensity to selfishness, since their incapacity 
to interrelate and coordinate with other agents in pursuit of a common ob-
jective becomes an insurmountable snare, any attempt to avoid which in-
exorably ends in a tragedy for humanity:
[...] Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase 
his herd without limit –in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all 
men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of 
the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all (Hardin, 1968: 1244).
The problem, therefore, lies in the impossibility that those involved will 
cooperate to find a mutually beneficial outcome, such as the efficient man-
agement of the common good or resource. Hardin, therefore advocates a 
solution external to civil society that prevents or controls all forms of par-
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ticipation in the common good or resource: privatise it, make it public or 
regulate it.
Turn it into private property: in this way access to and use of these 1. 
commons are restricted, allowing them to be efficiently managed and 
preventing the resource from running out. Hardin recognises that pri-
vate property is not a just solution, but, in his words, «injustice is pref-
erable to total ruin» (1968: 1247).
Turn it into public property: state management can also ensure restric-2. 
tion of access to and use of the common and, therefore, its long-term 
efficiency and durability (1968: 1245). Hardin seemingly understands 
that this would restrict the freedom to use the common, but as he 
states, establishing «an alternative to the commons need not be per-
fectly just to be preferable» (1968: 1247). 
Regulate it with external coercion: the state government ensures the 3. 
sustainability of resources with common usage through laws that im-
pose sanctions on those who infringe them (1968: 1247-1248). Again, 
as in the above cases, the solution is linked to the restriction of use 
and appropriation by all or many of those affected. 
These three possible solutions to the ‘tragedy of the commons’ put for-
ward in the paper of the same name expose a lack of trust in the capacities 
and possibilities of civil society to efficiently manage the common goods or 
resources on which its activity, survival and happiness depend. However, 
how agents and organisations actually behave is a long way from what Har-
din describes in his sombre and pessimistic paper. In most occasions ob-
served, players cooperate with other participants in, for instance, economic 
or political contexts where the great majority of participants regard this as 
a desirable attitude (Bowles and Gintis, 2011; Ferh et al., 2002; Gintis et al., 
2005; Cárdenas and Ostrom, 2004).
Game theory, for example, has achieved forms of cooperation based on 
the perfect and complete rationality that supposedly underlies all responses 
of the economic agent. Although it does not seem very likely, due to the self-
interested nature of the participants in strategy games, through equilibria 
–as a set of pure strategies, each one of which is the optimum strategy for 
each participant when the decisions of the other players are taken into ac-
count– the mathematician John F. Nash distanced himself from this idea by 
showing how and why cooperation can be achieved among people who are 
merely concerned to maximise their personal gain (1950a, 1950b).
The political scientist Elinor Ostrom later applied these same equilibria 
to demonstrate that not only was it possible to cooperate in a self-interested 
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way to achieve one’s own objective, sub-optimum in any event, but that the 
agents use feelings and the prosocial emotions that underlie them to gener-
ate interpersonal relationships with their peers with which they can meet 
common objectives efficiently (Ostrom, 2003; Ostrom and Ostrom, 2011). In 
field studies during the 1980s and 90s, Ostrom observed how various com-
mon goods, particularly common-pool resources such as forests, rivers and 
water basins, had managed to survive for centuries due to collective action 
institutions of civil society managed by their own agents without coercion 
or external control (Ostrom, 1986, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1994). It does not, 
therefore, seem to be true that the solution for the efficient and sustainable 
management of common goods or resources lies in turning them into pri-
vate or public property as Hardin suggested. According to Herbert A. Simon 
(1955), Ostrom’s studies demonstrated that the time available and the cogni-
tive and emotional capacities of the agents in the relationship had a deter-
mining role in rational decision-making processes (Ostrom, 1991, 1998a;). 
Unselfish cooperation was both possible and necessary to manage a socie-
ty’s common good (Ostrom, 1994).
The possibility that people can cooperate to meet common objectives in 
ways that are not merely driven by self interest has been supported in the 
neurosciences over the last decade. Neuroscientific studies have shown that, 
a) the neurological bases of human cooperation are not related to selfishness 
and the pleasure of reward, but to reciprocity and human altruism; b) the 
emotion afforded by the possibility of relating to others has a cognitive basis 
that, in many cases, is linked to experiences bound up with moral judge-
ments on whether a behaviour or decision is just or unjust; and c) people 
will punish behaviours that violate the social and moral norms even if by 
doing so their own personal gain may be depleted1 (Glimcher et al., 2009). 
Thus, these and other conclusions from the neurosciences reveal the incon-
sistency of the perfect and complete rationality on which Hardin grounded 
the presumed tragedy of the commons, and shows the real possibility of 
people interrelating and questioning in order to meet objectives that are 
increasingly complex and beneficial for those involved in an optimum, sus-
tainable and efficient way because of their emotional, communicative and 
critical competences (Tomasello, 2008, 2014b).
Evolutionary anthropology has also expressed similar ideas in recent 
years, through the understanding that the key factor in the development of 
all relational processes that are highly beneficial to all parties lies in people’s 
capacities to specify and implement common projects in which the me per-
spective is abandoned in favour of the us perspective to generate rules and 
1 Altruistic punishment is considered as a type of common good or resource (Tomasello, 2008, 
2014a). 
12 RECERCA, REVISTA DE PENSAMENT I ANÀLISI, NÚM. 15. 2014. ISSN: 1130-6149 - pp. 7-19
usage norms with which to coordinate their actions, and to commit to active 
respect for the agreements reached (Tomasello, 2008, 2014b), all of which 
derives from an emotional, relational, communicative and critical rationality 
that humans have developed through the evolutionary process.
Consequently, the efficient, sustainable and optimally beneficial manage-
ment of a society’ common goods or resources is possible, and occurs by 
strengthening –not excluding, restricting or regulating– civil society partici-
pation by encouraging institutions for collective action as Ostrom’s case 
studies in different countries so clearly showed (Ostrom, 1990, 1999a). Most 
states, however, continue to turn their backs on social movements in this 
sense, focusing their attention only on deciding between public and private 
management, even in cases of transnational commons with a universalisable 
interest such as air quality, public health care, conservation of biodiversity, 
defence of human rights or the management of scientific knowledge, among 
many others. In other words, a contradiction arises when the main parties 
involved and/or affected are excluded from their management because of 
their supposed incapacity to do so.
An outstanding example in this vein is the Svalbard Global Seed Vault 
(SGSV), located in Longyearbyen, Norway, promoted by the Norwegian gov-
ernment and funded by various states and international foundations. The 
main aim of the SGSV is to conserve biodiversity and guarantee food security 
for future generations against the threat of climate change. Paradoxically, 
while the states behind this initiative, on the one hand, put their efforts into 
managing this common good for the benefit of all humanity, they do nothing, 
or very little, to control internal production of genetically modified foods or 
to eradicate the high levels of unsustainable pollution caused by the GM in-
dustry, which are precisely two direct causes of the need for a Global Seed 
Vault in the first place, issues that are a direct challenge to the meaning of 
the initiative. 
Another particularly relevant case is that of biological resource centres 
(BRCs), also known as biobanks, which in Spain are defined in Law 14/2007, 
of 3 July, on Biomedical Research as a «public or private non-profit estab-
lishment which has a collection of biological samples conceived for bio-
medical diagnostic or research purposes and organised as a technical unit 
with criteria of quality, order and destination» (2007: 28830). Hence, they are 
considered as a common good or resource whose management Spanish law 
leaves in the hands of public and private centres so long as they are not-for-
profit organisations, thereby side-lining, or even restricting, possible civil 
society initiatives through the creation of collective action institutions that 
could be more efficient and sustainable in the medium and long term.
13PATRICI CALVO / STEFAN ERIKSSON  Civil society participation in the management of the common good
Allowing, but also encouraging and strengthening, active committed civil 
society participation in the management of these and other common goods 
or resources also calls for an adequate process to generate the legitimacy 
and credibility necessary to allow a specific activity to take place. For 
biobanks and, above all, the use of the information stored in them to be ap-
propriate, proper channels of communication are required to promote trans-
parency and engage in debate with society; in other words, in order to gener-
ate and strengthen society’s trust in the good management of these 
information pools a mature public opinion must be fostered, and this emerg-
es from civil society.
The creation of knowledge is, therefore, a common good or resource that 
needs civil society participation in order to be adequately generated and 
strengthened, especially when the questions at stake are of particular inter-
est to those involved and/or affected by such studies, such as protecting data 
on the subjects of the research, determining future social policies or devel-
oping research areas and projects.
CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN THE ETHICAL MANAGEMENT 
OF BIOBANKS
The world of biobank or BRC research is interesting from the point of view 
of the common good, as it, from one perspective, so clearly starts out from a 
conception of our genes being a common resource –this in contrast to most 
other research. Article one of the Universal Declaration on the Human Ge-
nome and Human Rights states that the «human genome …, in a symbolic 
sense, is the heritage of humanity». This has led many to object to the com-
mercialisation of genetic research and its products, and, when it nevertheless 
is subject to intellectual property regimens, to put great emphasis on bene-
fit-sharing (Dauda & Dierickx 2013).
On the other hand, the world of medical research has been called «a lin-
gering bastion of medical paternalism, an ivory tower left unquestioned for 
too long» (Johansson, 2014). This stems from a «failure to realize or acknowl-
edge that patients possess and can add experiences and insights that medi-
cal professionals and other involved parties lack» (ibid). Civil society might, 
on the contrary, argue that with regard to biobanking it should also have a 
say in a) what projects are undertaken, b) how they are designed, c) con-
ducted, and d) the results implemented among stakeholders and in society. 
Only then will a public good –biobanks owned by universities and hospi-
tals– be used such as to make it more akin to a common good, i.e. something 
that self-organising communities collectively oversee and steer in order to 
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preserve as a resource for themselves and for future patients. The more 
space for civil society to negotiate the production and use of samples and 
the information they potentially provide, the more biobanks turn into a com-
mon good. 
Strictly speaking, it will seldom become one, as research is a public activ-
ity and distribution channels of science is primarily situated in the larger 
scientific community. This does neither imply the impossibility for it to have 
aspects of public and common goods simultaneously, nor for trying to 
strengthen its character as common. On the contrary, such a movement is 
already on its way –and in a sense, some forms of research trusts could po-
tentially serve as fully developed collective action institutions. Moreover, as 
science is a universal undertaking, prone to crossing borders, participatory 
action in this sphere might manage a feat many proponents of common 
goods see as ideal –but which is very seldom realised– that of partaking in a 
global endeavor not restricted to national interests governed by states. In 
concrete terms: When networks of biobanks operate on a transnational basis, 
participatory action institutions might have an advantage –compared to na-
tional institutions– in being able to act with the same authority in such a 
setting as in a national one.
Involvement of the public in research is being developed in various direc-
tions today. One approach discussed herein is a «participant-centered» –or 
–led or –driven– one, which has been defined as «‘tools, programs and 
projects that empower participants to engage in the research process’ using 
interactive information technology» (Kaye et al., 2012). A key feature of such 
approaches, they say, is that patients and participants are found at the center 
of decision making «as equal partners in the research process» (ibid), an idea 
that actually seems much stronger than just having people engage in re-
search through the help of IT tools. 
Instead of saying that such approaches are all participant-centered in the 
same sense or to the same degree one could speak of different levels of par-
ticipatory strength in various initiatives. Many of the initiatives mentioned 
by Kaye et al. (2012) are simply using modern information technology to 
facilitate the recruitment of and communication with research participants 
without necessarily giving participants more of a voice or power in the ac-
tual research being conducted. This would constitute a weak model of par-
ticipation –one similar to the traditional model of participation, simply with 
more technological tools for recruitment and so on. If participants are given 
the resources and opportunity to, for example, manage their individual in-
formed consent continuously or engage with each other –thus strengthen-
ing their participatory authority and the sense of community respectively–, 
we could talk of a moderate model of participation. A model that empowers 
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participants to collectively act in order to drive either a) what projects are 
undertaken, b) how they are designed, c) conducted, or d) the results imple-
mented among stakeholders and in society, or a combination thereof, would 
make a strong model of participation.
Examples of moderate or PCI models already exist. Kaye et al. listed the 
following a few years ago: PatientsLikeMe, TuAnalyze, and Genomera, all from 
the USA, and Genomes Unzipped from the UK (Kaye et al., 2012). These are 
not considered strong models of participation, as put forth in this article, 
because they are still mainly based on the «need to place the individual at 
the centre of decision making» (ibid, our italics). Another recent example of 
an initiative that seems keen to engage citizens primarily to educate them 
and to gain acceptance for policy is the Consensus research project (http://
www.consensus-project.eu/). Yet other examples of engagement are 23andMe 
(Vayena & Tasioulas, 2013), the U.S. Patient-Centered Outcomes Research 
Institute (Johansson, 2014), and the muscular dystrophy patients that en-
gaged greatly in research (Callon & Rabeharisoa 2008). As biobanking has 
turned out to be expensive –both Genizon in Quebec, Canada and deCODE 
Genetics in Iceland have gone bankrupt–, it is not surprising that biobanks 
have searched widely for economic support, also from charities and the like 
(Caulfield et al., 2014).
A strong model of participation could have numerous advantages in fur-
thering science –lowering costs, promoting recruitment, lowering drop-out, 
promoting clinical applications, etc. (Nielsen, 2012). Such benefits are never-
theless not necessarily linked to such a model; it might as well fail in accom-
plishing the goods and another model, for example a moderate participatory 
one or one of industry partnerships, might do better in practice. But the 
most important gain from the perspective of this paper would be that a 
strong participatory model could strengthen democratic involvement and 
the civic society’s opportunities for making the research endeavor also 
theirs, so that public engagement in someone else’s project is ultimately 
turned into collective civic action – a good that is conceptually linked to 
such a model.
Such action would expand on the possible futures in which the uses of 
science and technology uphold, transform, and re-imagine the ways we live, 
and not just accept at face value the demands for competitiveness, develop-
ment, and economic growth coming more and more often from policy mak-
ers, industry and academia – who do share a common managerial logic 
which results in such objectives being dominate (Science in Society, 2012).
What are the risks with this aspirational vision? One is of course that 
what would first pass for strong participatory engagement in fact is nothing 
more than a more elaborate way of pushing people to where the researchers 
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–or funders of research– want them to be. Another is that the participant 
group seldom is homogenous. Thus a research endeavor might result in con-
flicts where one group decides for another or the research never even be-
comes feasible.2 These risks are real and strategies need to be developed in 
order to minimize them; but, they aren’t objections to the vision itself. Such 
objections are rather of a political-economic nature where other values than 
those above are given precedence –liberal ideas of research autonomy or the 
need for economic development etc. Ultimately, whether we should strive 
for strong participatory action –as defined herein– in biobank research is a 
question of what kind of society we wish to live in and what we take to be 
the fundamental values of that society.
Of particular interest is the fact that institutionalised biobanks, often set 
up as non-profit entities or organisations, might have to turn to commer-
cialisation strategies to secure their continued existence and to comply with 
funders’ wishes for utility and societal applications (Caulfield et al., 2014). 
We do know that commercialization is a major issue for sample providers/
participants (ibid); participatory action would in such a situation enable 
them to not only address the question whether to actually engage in a pub-
lic-private partnership, but also to affect the very terms of this relationship. 
For example, if participants fear losing control over how their samples and 
data are used by the biobank and those utilising it, having representatives 
who participate in the decision-making –and having the opportunity to do 
so oneself– could be that which makes the activities acceptable or even 
trustworthy in the eyes of participants. 
If, ultimately, a choice is made in favour of civil society participation, 
much remains to be worked through. Familiar notions of risk and ethical 
considerations, such as conflict of interests, exploitation and the therapeutic 
misconception, might be exacerbated in some participatory research. Re-
search ethics and regulations are individual-centered –both with regard to 
e.g. consent and to protection of data– and thus ill-equipped to deal with 
this novel phenomenon which includes collective action and strongly pro-
motes sharing sensitive data. Not to mention that they still are predomi-
nantly national and sectional in nature and thus might lack the means to 
oversee initiatives crossing national or institutional borders. Research 
projects may even fall outside the scope of the usual oversight mechanisms, 
as they might lack state recognition and an institutional dimension (Vayena 
& Tasioulas, 2013). Ownership and decision rights over samples and data are 
still contested issues. The question of who legitimately can act as a repre-
sentative of others is another difficult one. The researchers might interpret 
2  See Schuklenk & Kleinsmidt, 2006, for some examples on these.
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calls for participatory engagement as an infringement on their autonomy 
and skill, and as an obstacle to do good research, so there’s a need to think 
more deeply about the division of roles in cooperative research and the 
forms for decision-making that could be implemented.
As have been pointed out by European Scientific Review Groups, a large 
body of research has shown that ‘science’ and ‘society’ are not «clearly delim-
ited or predefined entities» but «fluid and take shape in heterogeneous, 
context-specific forms». Therefore, participatory action and other forms of 
public engagement «represent locations (or spaces) where values and norms 
and thus power relations are negotiated» (Science in Society, 2012). This 
means that ethical debate and regulatory advances in this field must be an 
on-going effort which will never be completed; as long as our societies are 
in «continuous transformation» (ibid), the myriad ways that participatory ac-
tion can be reframed will make the need for again thinking through its goals 
and forms of operation ever present, ever new.
To begin to do this, we need to learn more about present initiatives: how 
they are set up, how they function and whether they succeed in realizing 
both scientific and participatory ends. This issue of Recerca. Revista de Pen-
sament i Anàlisi serves as a general starting point for discussing such issues 
and stimulating further exploration into the subject.3
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